

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-12

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IO-13 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05

PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05 DOE-11

DOEE-00 SOE-02 SSO-00 NRC-05 /105 W

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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2615

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION USNATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0015

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: JANUARY 31 EASTERN PLENARY STATEMENT

AT THE FIRST PLENARY MEETING OF THE FOURTEENTH ROUND OF

THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS ON JANUARY 31, CANADIAN REP (COX)

AND POLISH REP (STRULAK)

DELIVERED THE ONLY STATEMENTS.

CANDIAN REP'S PRESENTATION IS BEING REPORTED SEPARATELY.

IN HIS STATEMENT, STRULAK BROKE NO NEW SUBSTANTIVE GROUND

AND GAVE NO CLEAR INDICATION OF PROBABLE EASTERN TACTICS

FOR THE HANDLING OF THE DATA DISCUSSION IN THE NEW ROUND

ALTHOUGH HE DID BLAME THE WEST FOR THE FAILURE TO EXCHANGE

ADDITIONAL DATA IN THE LAST ROUND. STRULAK ALSO SHARPLY

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CRITICIZED WESTERN FORCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS,

SPECIFICALLY MENTIONING NEUTRON WEAPONS AND NEW

DELIVERY SYSTEMS, WHICH HE INDICATED, OPENED WESTERN

MOTIVES TO QUESTION SINCE STEPS TO CONTINUE THE ARMS

RACE IN EUROPE WERE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE AIMS OF THE

NEGOTIATIONS. THE MAIN POINTS OF THE POLISH STATEMENT,

THE FULL TEXT OF WHICH FOLLOWS BY AIRGRAM, WERE:

1. EASTERN PARTICIPANTS REMAIN CONVINCED THAT THESE VITAL AND UNPRECEDENTED NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD LEAD TO LOWER LEVELS OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE WITHOUT UPSETTING THE EXISTING MILITARY EQUILIBRIUM THERE.

2. SUCH A RESULT IS INDISPENSABLE BOTH FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF DETENTE AND FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF THE VALID AND ACHIEVABLE MUTUALLY AGREED OBJECTIVE OF STRENGTHENING PEACE, SECURITY AND STABILITY IN EUROPE.

3. FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR PROGRESS EXIST IN THE PREVAILING ATMOSPHERE OF DETENTE AS IS EVIDENCED BY THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND THE BELGRADA REVIEW CONFERENCE.

4. THE CONTINUED HIGH CONCENTRATION OF ARMS IN EUROPE IS OUT OF STEP WITH DETENTE, THE CSCE FINAL ACT AND THE HOPES FOR AN EARLY SALT II AGREEMENT.

5. THE FAILURE TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS IS ALL THE MORE NOTEWORTHY GIVEN THE WEST'S ACTIVITIES AIMED AT INTENSIFYING THE ARMS RACE, WHICH GO COUNTER TO THE GOALS OF THESE TALKS.

6. ESPECIALLY DANGEROUS ARE PLANS TO DEVELOP AND DEPLOY NEW TYPES OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION,
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IN PARTICULAR NEUTRON WEAPONS AND NEW DELIVERY SYSTEMS.

7. POLAND SUPPORTS THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO RENOUNCE THE PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEUTRON WEAPONS SINCE PROCEEDING WITH THIS WEAPON WOULD INTENSIFY THE ARMS RACE, DESTABILIZE THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL SITUATION, AND COMPLICATE THESE TALKS.

8. THE EXPANSION OF NATO'S MILITARY POTENTIAL, WHEN COMPARED WITH WESTERN ATTITUDES IN THE VIENNA TALKS, RAISE QUESTIONS WHICH REQUIRE AN ANSWER.

9. THEREFORE, THE EAST IS JUSTIFIED IN ASKING FOR GUARANTEES THAT WESTERN STATES WILL PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS, CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROCESS OF MILITARY DETENTE AND REFRAIN FROM ACTIONS DETRIMENTAL TO THAT GOAL SINCE THE EAST BELIEVES THAT DETENTE AND THE ARMS RACE ARE INCOMPATIBLE.

10. THE EAST IS COMPELLED TO CONCLUDE THAT THE WESTERN POSITION IN THE TALKS HAS BEEN MORE STRONGLY INFLUENCED BY THE WEST'S DESIRE TO STRENGTHEN ITS MILITARY POSTURE IN CENTRAL EUROPE THAN BY ITS DESIRE TO CONSOLIDATE

DETENTE.

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

11. THE TALKS HAVE ACHIEVED SOME POSITIVE RESULTS IN
THE FORM OF THE ACCEPTANCE OF COMMON PRINCIPLES BY WHICH
ALL PARTICIPANTS MUST ABIDE.

12. BUT AMBIGUOUS INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SUBJECT
MATTER AND OBJECTIVE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH INFRINGE
UPON THE UNDERSTANDINGS CONCERNING THE AREA OF REDUCT-
IONS AND MEASURES ASSOCIATED WITH THEM, SEEK TO DIVERT
THE NEGOTIATIONS AND CAN ONLY BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE.

13. THE FLEXIBLE EASTERN APPROACH HAS BEEN DEMON-
STRATED BY EASTERN PROPOSALS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE RE-
DUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AS WELL AS BY
THE EAST'S FEBRUARY 1976 AND INTERIM FREEZE PROPOSALS.
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14. THERE WAS NO PROGRESS ON KEY ISSUES IN THE LAST ROUND NOR, BECAUSE THE WEST COULD NOT PROVIDE AN UAMBIGUOUSLY POSITIVE REPLY TO THE EAST'S OCTOBER 25 COMPROMISE PROPOSAL, WAS THERE AN EXCHANGE OF ADDITIONAL DATA.

15. THIS STAGNANT SITUATION STEMS FROM THE WEST'S UNREALISTIC INSISTENCE ON SECURING UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES BY CHANGING THE EXISTING CORRELATION OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

16. THE DIVERGENT POSITIONS OF THE SIDES AND RESULTING STALEMATE ARE A FUNCTION OF:

A) THE WEST'S DENIAL OF THE EXISTENCE OF APPROXIMATE MILITARY PARITY AND CONSEQUENT DEMANDS FOR ASYMMETRIC REDUCTIONS;

B) THE WEST'S ATTEMPTS TO SECURE COLLECTIVE CEILINGS IN ORDER TO EXCLUDE OR LIMIT THE REDUCTIONS OF THE LARGEST COMPONENT OF NATO'S MILITARY POTENTIAL IN CENTRAL EUROPE;

C) THE ARTIFICIAL ATTEMPTS BY THE WEST TO GAIN COMPENSATION THROUGH TENDENTIOUS APPEALS TO THE SO-CALLED GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR; AND

D) THE WEST'S REFUSAL TO REDUCE AIR FORCES AND ARMAMENTS.

17. IT IS NECESSARY TO REDUCE AND LIMIT NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE AREA, BUT WESTERN PROPOSALS IN THIS REGARD ARE INCONSISTENT AND INSUFFICIENT.
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18. THE WEST HAS PERSISTED IN ITS UNJUSTIFIED DEMANDS DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY WOULD DIMINISH EASTERN SECURITY AND HAS NOT ACCEPTED EASTERN APPEALS FOR AT LEAST PARTIAL SOLUTIONS THAT WOULD HALVE THE ARMS RACE IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

19. THE DATA DISCUSSION SHOULD BE SUBSIDIARY TO FUNDAMENTAL REDUCTION ISSUES.

20. IF THE WEST WOULD APPROACH THE BASIC REDUCTION QUESTIONS REALISTICALLY, IT WOULD MAKE IT EASIER TO DEFINE THE EXISTING STATE OF APPROXIMATE FORCE PARITY

IN THE AREA IN TECHNICAL AND NUMERICAL TERMS WITHOUT
UNNECESSARILY PENETRATING DEFENSE STRUCTURES.

21. THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP OF POLAND HAS STATED ITS
RESOLVE TO CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE DEVELOPMENT
OF DETENTE AND TO THE HALTING OF THE ARMS RACE.

22. THIS ATTITUDE APPLIES FULLY TO THE APPROACH
OF THE POLISH DELEGATION TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS.RESOR

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